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LUCA BIANCHI 
From Pope Urban VIII to Bishop Étienne 
Tempier: the Strange History of the “Doctrine 
of Double Truth” 
1. “TWO CONTRADICTING TRUTHS, EXISTING SIDE BY SIDE – ONE RELIGIOUS, THE 
OTHER SCIENTIFIC” 
In 1947, when Bertold Brecht was finishing the so-called ‘American’ version 
of his Life of Galileo, the distinguished American scriptwriter Barrie Stavies 
also produced in New York a play on Galileo, titled Lamp at Midnight. Des-
tined to an extraordinary success, translated in about thirty languages, 
produced in different countries and even adapted for the small screen in 
the 1960s, this work is not a masterpiece. It presents – like Brecht’s play – a 
one-sided and rather anachronistic picture of Galileo’s conflict with his 
contemporaries. Galileo is described as the champion of freedom of 
thought and the advocate of scientific knowledge, opposed by a legion of 
enemies (Aristotelian philosophers, Scholastically-trained theologians and 
Church authorities), who are all shown as dogmatic defenders of the tradi-
tional worldview. This is not to say that Stavies did not rely on a systema-
tic, though hasty, reading of seventeenth-century sources: he even used 
some minor works such as the Dianoia astronomica, optica, physica publi-
shed in 1611 by Francesco Sizzi, which is probably the silliest work ever 
written against Galileo’s astronomic discoveries. Nonetheless, the charac-
ter of Cardinal Maffeo Barberini (the Florentine nobleman who later beca-
me pope Urban VIII) is largely fictitious. Stavies’s pope is ready to do 
anything to defend the Church and its intellectual and political interests 
from what he perceives as the threat of the Dialogue concerning the two 
chief world systems: a book that he considers dangerous because – as Sta-
vies makes him say in Act II, scene 4 – it “will encourage people to think 
[…], will teach people how to think!”.1 In the previous Act I, scene 4, 
Maffeo, while still a cardinal and Galileo’s friend, had instead tried to offer 
him an easy way out to avoid the clash between the new Copernican cos-
 
1 STAVIS, Barrie: Lamp at Midnight. A Play about Galileo, I, 4. New York: A.S. Barnes 1966, 
62, Stavies’ emphasis. See also 21–22 for implicit references to Sizzi’s work. A first draft of 
this paper was read in English at the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, June 11, 2014) 
and in Italian at the workshop organized by Marco Lamanna at Villa Vigoni (Bellagio, Sep-
tember 2, 2015). I am grateful to all participants for their helpful comments. The oral style of 
both presentations has been preserved. All italics in quotations are mine unless otherwise 
stated. 
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mology and the traditional reading of a few scriptural passages affirming 
the stability of the earth and the mobility of the sun. This remarkable 
passage reads: 
 
BARBERINI: And yet – even as I admire Jupiter and her moons, this host of 
extravagant heavenly beauty, I cannot help but wonder how you will make 
this astronomy of yours fit in with Holy Scripture. 
GALILEO: I do not anticipate any great difficulty. 
BARBERINI: How so? Or do you intend to advance a doctrine of double 
truth? 
GALILEO: A doctrine of double truth? 
BARBERINI: Two contradicting truths, existing side by side – one religious, 
the other scientific. Each valid in its own category, but false in the other. 
GALILEO: Such theological juggling bewilders me. 
BARBERINI: It’s really very simple once you get the knack of it (They laugh).2 
 
It would be hard to imagine a more implausible exchange between the his-
torical Maffeo Barberini and the historical Galileo. Galileo would have 
never described the “doctrine of double truth” as “theological juggling”, 
nor would he have thought of using it. We know indeed that in his so-
called Copernican Letters, written between 1613 and 1615 and devoted to 
examining the relationship between scientific and scriptural truths, Galileo 
repeatedly claimed that “two truths cannot be contrary to one another”3 – 
a statement that he repeated in his masterpiece, the Dialogue, published in 
1632.4 As to Maffeo Barberini, he would have hardly suggested how to 
 
2 Ibidem: 34, Stavies’ emphasis. 
3 “[…] ed essendo di più manifesto che due verità non posson mai contrariarsi […]”, 
Lettera a D. Benedetto Castelli, in: FAVARO, Antonio (ed.): Le Opere di Galileo Galilei. Firenze: 
Barbèra 1890–1909 (hereafter OG), vol. 5, 283; “ed essendo, come si è detto, che due verità 
non possono contrariarsi […]”; “[…] poi che due veri non possono mai contrariarsi”, Lettera a 
Madama Cristina di Lorena, ibidem, 320, 330. See also the letter to Pietro Dini (May, 1615), 
in: OG, vol. 12, 184: “[…] onde non potendo 2 veritati contrariarsi […]”; the Considerazioni 
circa l’opinione copernicana, in: OG, vol. 5, 364: “[…] non potendo un vero contrariare a un 
altro vero”. Clearly echoing the passage of the Nicomachean Ethics I, 8, discussed below, a 
few pages before (OG, vol. 5, 356) Galileo wrote: “chi è quello che non sappia, concordan-
tissima essere l’armonia di tutti i veri in natura, ed asprissimamente dissonare le false posi-
zioni dagli effetti veri”. 
4 “[…] perchè chiara cosa è che due veri non si posson contrariare”, Dialogo, in: OG, vol. 
7, 80. It has been argued that in both the Copernican Letters and the Dialogue Galileo relies 
on Benedict Perera, who in his Commentaria in Genesim wrote that the truth of the Bible 
cannot clash with true conclusions established through human reasons and experience, 
“cum verum omne semper cum vero congruat”: see e.g. CAPPIELLO, Annalisa/LAMANNA, Mar-
co: Il principio dell’unicità del vero dalla bolla ‘Apostolici regiminis’ alla Rivoluzione scienti-
fica, in: Quaestio 14 (2014), 230–256, at 253–254. However it might be, it is worth noting that 
while presenting the principle of the unity of truth Galileo always makes use of the verbs 
“contrariare” and “contrariarsi”, following – at least in terminology – an earlier tradition of 
this principle, which goes back to Albert the Great: see below nt. 11. 
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defend the truths of reason against the truths of faith. We know indeed 
that already as a cardinal he had a penchant for banning all philosophical 
doctrines supposedly contrary to religious beliefs. He even asked his 
theological advisor to examine Aristotle’s De anima in order to establish if 
it denied the immortality of the soul and, in case it did, he contemplated 
the possibility of forbidding its teaching at the university of Bologna.5 We 
also know that in 1633, a few months after he had condemned Galileo, 
Maffeo – now pope Urban VIII – received from the Jesuit theologian 
Melchior Inchofer, who had played a pivotal role in Galileo’s trial, a 
treatise entitled Tractatus syllepticus. In this treatise, expressly conceived 
as a justification of the sentence against Galileo, Inchofer rebukes Coperni-
cans for using an “artful distinction”, claiming that the earth moves and 
the sun is immobile “according to philosophy – as they say – however it 
might be according to theology”. He adds that “nothing is true according 
to philosophy, if it is not true also according to theology, truth indeed 
does not contradict truth [Verum enim non contradicit Vero] as it is said in 
the Decree of the Lateran Council, eighth Session”.6 
 
5 See BIANCHI, Luca: Agostino Oreggi, qualificatore del Dialogo, e i limiti della conoscenza 
scientifica, in: MONTESINOS, José/SOLÍS SANTOS, Carlos (eds.): ‘Largo campo di filosofare’. Eu-
rosymposium Galileo 2001. La Orotava: Fundación Canaria Horotava de Historia de la Ciencia 
2001, 575–584, at 578–580. 
6 INCHOFER, Melchior: Tractatus Syllepticus. Romae: L. Grignanus 1633, 91–92. See BE-
RETTA, Francesco: ‘Omnibus Christianae, Catholicaeque Philosophiae amantibus. D.D.’. Le 
Tractatus syllepticus de Melchior Inchofer, censeur de Galilée, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie und Theologie 48 (2001), 301–328, in particular 317–322; BIANCHI, Luca: Pour une 
histoire de la “double vérité” (= Conférences Pierre Abélard). Vrin: Paris 2008, 152–154. In-
chofer’s accusations were not unprecedented. In 1631 Cesare Marsili reported to Galileo (OG, 
vol. 14, 282–283) that Giovanni Cuttunio, who then taught philosophy at Bologna university, 
“si è molto addolorato, per quanto mi è parso, in vedere che, contro il decreto, come egli 
dicie [sic], della Congregazione dell’Indice, V.S. habbi spuntato il poterne, ancorché come 
per favola, e senza determinazione veruna, filosoficamente porgere occasione di credere 
quello che è contro alla verità cattolica, alla quale né la filosofia o astronomia può veridica-
mente contraddire, essendo imposibile [sic] che la verità di una cosa non sia una sola, non 
pensando che la mobilità del sole scansi il decreto, come io gli ho detto et è stato confirmato 
da cannonisti [sic] e teologici”. See BERETTA: ‘Omnibus Christianae, Catholicaeque Philoso-
phiae amantibus’, 309, nt. 37. It has not been hitherto noticed that this witness is in keeping 
with Cuttunio’s claim in his commentary on Artistotle’s Meteorologica, published precisely 
in 1631 (Lectiones Ioannis Cottunii […] in primum Aristotelis de meteoris […]. Bononiae: 
Tebaldinus 1631, 96–97): “Pro hac ipsa veritate asserunt Doctores nostri complura sacrarum 
litterarum elogia. Hoc uno contenti simus quod in capite primo Ecclesiaste legitur: Terra in 
aeternum stat: oritur Sol, et occidit, et al locum suum revertitur, ibique renascens, gyrat per 
Meridiem, et flectitur ad Aquilonem. Quod verum non esset, si Sole quiescente, terra cir-
cumdaretur. Quocirca summa cum ratione Romana Congregatione Indicis, opinionem illam, 
aequo iussu oppressit: quamquam nonnulla adhuc mussent, quod me movit, ut hanc dis-
putationem paulo uberius pertractarem, et firmissimis rationum momentis terrae firmitatem 
constabilirem, quod me consecutum esse plane confido, ut hi intelligant, verum non adver-
sari vero”. 
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12 
Reference here is to the well-known bull Apostolici regiminis, published 
in 1513 by pope Leo X, which censured philosophical doctrines challenging 
the Christian faith. The main targets of this bull, which officially affirmed 
that the immortality of the individual soul is an article of faith, were ‘Aver-
roists’ (namely, the defenders of the doctrine of the unity of the intellect) 
and ‘Alexandrists’ (namely, the defenders of the mortality of the soul). The 
bull denounced that there were some masters who asserted that such in-
terpretations of Aristotle’s philosophy were “true at least according to 
philosophy”. Arguing that “truth does not contradict truth [Cumque verum 
vero minime contradicat]”, the bull declared that every utterance contrary 
to the Christian faith was “totally false”; moreover, it enjoined professors 
of philosophy to strenuously support the articles of faith, to teach them in 
the most convincing way and – most importantly – “to apply themselves to 
the full extent of their energies to refuting and disposing of the philoso-
phers’ opposing arguments, since all the solutions [were] available”.7 
Francesco Beretta has convincingly shown that it is precisely this last 
regulation which provided the juridical ground for Galileo’s condemna-
tion. On June 22, 1633, the Italian scientist was indeed obliged to recant as 
“vehemently suspected of heresy” because he had published a book, i.e. the 
Dialogue, where he defended the Copernican theory. According to the text 
of the abjuration, in so doing he had violated not only the Decree of the 
Congregation of the Index, which in 1624 had banned Copernicanism as 
contrary to the literal sense of Scripture, but also the injunction not “to 
hold, defend or teach” Copernicanism “in any way whatsoever”: the com-
mission entrusted by the pope with the assessment of the Dialogue (with 
Inchofer among its members) had indeed ascertained that Galileo adduced 
“very effective reasons in its favour, without refuting them in any way”.8  
It is therefore clear that Barrie Stavies’ notion that Galileo might have 
avoided problems with the Church authorities by invoking “a doctrine of 
double truth” is based on a complete misunderstanding of the position of 
both Maffeo Barberini and Galileo. There is no need to say that dramatists 
are allowed to simplify, deform and rewrite the past, transforming real 
men in symbols (or even in caricatures). It remains that historians have 
the task of understanding the past, and in so doing they often discover 
that its script is much more complicated, ambiguous, unexpected and 
 
7 MANSI, Johannes Dominicus (ed.): Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio. 
Parisiis: Expensis Huberti Welter, Bibliopolae 1902, vol. 32, c. 842. On this bull and its im-
pact see at least BIANCHI: Pour une histoire, 117–156 (with bibliography). 
8 “Ma poiché da questo S. Off.o, per aver io […] scritto e dato alle stampe un libro nel 
quale tratto l’istessa dottrina già dannata e apporto ragioni con molta efficacia a favor di 
essa, senza apportare alcuna solutione, sono stato vehementemente sospettato d’heresia 
[…]”, OG, vol. 19, 406. On this point see BIANCHI: Pour une histoire, 144–149. 
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13 
therefore fascinating than writers can imagine.9 As a matter of fact we 
have seen that Church authorities condemned Galileo – who advertised a 
new cosmology against the Aristotelians – by applying to his case regula-
tions originally conceived to control the teaching of ‘Averroists’ and ‘Ale-
xandrists’, i.e. masters of philosophy who supported different interpreta-
tions of Aristotle’s psychology; we have seen that a few months after its 
dramatic end one of the keynote figures in the trial, i.e. the Jesuit Melchior 
Inchofer, insinuated that in his battle for Copernicanism Galileo had made 
use of the “artful distinction” between what can be said “according to phi-
losophy” and what can be said “according to theology”; and we have also 
seen that Galileo accepted instead the principle of the unity of truth, for-
mally established in 1513 by the Fifth Lateran Council, whose guidelines for 
the teaching of philosophy were used, one hundred and twenty years later, 
against him. 
2. OMNIA VERA VERO CONSONANT 
But what are the origins and the meaning of what, borrowing an expres-
sion introduced by Richard C. Taylor,10 I called the principle of the unity of 
truth? We have seen that in Galileo’s works it is formulated thus: “two 
truths cannot be contrary to one another”. We have also seen that Incho-
fer, following the bull Apostolici regiminis, presents it as follows: “truth 
does not contradict truth”. But other versions of our principle also circula-
ted: “truth is not [or: cannot be] contrary to truth”,11 “truth is not opposite 
to truth”,12 “truth is consonant with truth”,13 “all truths are consonant with 
 
9 The thesis that for the historian the past is no less unpredictable than the future is 
convincingly argued by ROSSI, Paolo: Un altro presente. Saggi sulla storia della filosofia. 
Bologna: Il Mulino 1999, 27–30.  
10 See TAYLOR, Richard: “Truth Does Not Contradict Truth”: Averroes and the Unity of 
Truth, in: Topoi 19 (2000), 3–16. 
11 Formulas of this kind are often used by Albert the Great. See e.g. In Aristotelis librum 
Peri hermeneias, II, l. 2, c. 7, in: Opera Omnia. Ed. Auguste Borgnet. Parisiis: Apud Ludo-
vicum Vivès, Bibliopolam editorem 1890, vol. 1, 454b and 456b: “Et supponamus quod verum 
vero non contrariatur […] quia sive sint ambae una opinio, sive plures, constat quod ambae 
verae sunt: verum autem vero non contrariatur”; “vera autem opinio verae non contrariatur: 
quia verum vero non potest esse contrarium”; In IV Sententiarum, d. 10, a. 9, in: Opera Omnia. 
Ed. Auguste Borgnet. Parisiis: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, Bibliopolam editorem 1894, vol. 29, 
261b: “Nullum verum vero est contrarium: ergo omne verum cum quolibet vero salvatur”.  
12 See e.g. BONAVENTURE OF BAGNOREGIO: In Secundum librum Sententiarum, d. 15, dub. 3, 
in: Opera Omnia. Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae 1885, vol. 2, 389b: “ve-
rum vero non opponitur”. In the prologue (ibidem, 2b) Bonaventure wrote instead: “[…] quia 
verum non contrariatur vero”. 
13 See e.g. NICOLAS OF CUSA: De venatione sapientiae, c. 2, in: Opera Omnia. Ed. Raymun-
dus Klibanski/Iohannnes G. Senger. Hamburgi: In Aedibus Felicis Meiner 1932, vol. 12, 9: 
“Verum enim vero consonat”; MARTIN LUTHER: Disputatio theologica an haec propositio sit 
vera in Philosophia: Verbum caro factum est, in: Luthers Werke (= Weimarer Ausgabe 39.2). 
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14 
truth”.14 Variations in phrasing do not imply different ways of conceiving 
the principle, nor do they reflect different sources of inspiration. As a 
matter of fact, it is obvious that its roots are to be found in the Aristotelian 
tradition,15 and this was undoubtedly the source of both Galileo and the 
members of the commission that redacted the 1513 bull. Though influenced 
by different currents of thought (Thomism, Scotism and Platonism) the 
theologians working in the eighth Session of the Fifth Lateran Council 
were all trained in Scholastic philosophy and they all mastered Aristotle’s 
thought.16 As to Galileo – often too hastily labelled as an ‘anti-Aristotelian’ 
– he was not only well acquainted with the Stagirite’s writings, but also 
knew and used extensively the sayings and maxims that had been extrac-
ted from his works, and circulated in compilations of florilegia.17 It is pre-
cisely in the most widely diffused of these florilegia, the so-called Auctori-
tates Aristotelis redacted around the end of the thirteenth century by the 
Franciscan friar Johannes de Fonte, that one can find the standard version 
of our principle: “all truths are consonant with truth [omnia vera vero 
consonant]”.18 
It is worth noting that this version of the principle of the unity of truth 
is not traceable, in this precise wording, in the Aristotelian corpus, but was 
freely extracted from the Nicomachean Ethics (I, 8, 1098b 10-11), where the 
Stagirite actually makes a rather different claim, which in medieval Latin 
translations was rendered thus: “Vero quidem enim omnia consonant exis-
tencia, falso autem cito dissonat vero”.19 This can be judged as a faithful 
translation, the Greek expression panta […] ta uparchonta being rendered 
 
Wiemar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger 1932, 3: “Etsi tenendum est, quod dicitur: Omne 
verum vero consonat […]”. 
14 See the saying of the Auctoritates Aristotelis examined below. 
15 This is not to say, of course, that one cannot find elsewhere anything similar. See e.g. 
SCOTUS ERIUGENA: De divina pradestinatione, 3 (= CCCM 50). Ed. Goulven Madec. Turnhout: 
Brepols 1982, 19 : “Verae quidem non sunt, quoniam omne quod veritati contradicit a veritate 
non est. Omne quod a veritate est verum esse necesse est”; JOHN OF SALISBURY: Policraticus, l. 
2, c. 29 (= CCCM 118). Ed. K.S.B. Keats-Rohan. Turnhout: Brepols 1993, 170: “[…] quia uerum 
uero nequit esse contrarium nec bonum bono”. 
16 On this point see PRICE, Daniel: The Origins of Lateran’s V’s Apostolici Regiminis, in: 
Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum 17 (1985), 464–472. 
17 See BIANCHI, Luca: Conclusions, in: HAMESSE, Jacqueline/MEIRINHOS, José Francisco 
(eds): Les ‘Auctoritates Aristotelis’, leur utilisation et leur influence chez les auteurs médié-
vaux. État de la question 40 ans après la publication. Barcelona: FIDEM 2015, 317–331, at 326–
331. 
18 HAMESSE, Jacqueline: Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude histo-
rique et édition critique (= Philosophes Médiévaux 17). Louvain: Publications Universitaires 
1974, 233 §15. 
19 Ethica Nicomachea, translatio Roberti Grosseteste […] (= AL, vol. 26.1-3, f. IV). Ed. 
René-Antoine Gauthier. Leiden: Brill 1973, 385. The same translation (without the adverb 
“cito”) had beeen provided by the so called Ethica nova: see Ethica Nicomachea, translatio 
antiquissima […] (= AL 26.1-3, f. II). Ed. René-Antoine Gauthier. Leiden: Brill 1972, 80. 
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as omnia […] existencia. If a few contemporary translators reproduce 
almost verbatim this rendering,20 most of them go a little further and 
allow Aristotle to say that “all facts”, “all data” are in accord with what is 
true.21 It would be interesting to examine how this passage – whose 
meaning is less obvious than one might presume – was translated and 
interpreted by medieval, Renaissance and modern scholars. Two points, 
however, seem clear. First, although a great variety of (sometimes 
unexpected) readings of this passage were suggested, none of them 
exercised, from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, a greater 
influence than the scholastic formula extracted from it and spread by the 
Auctoritates Aristotelis. Second, this formula produced a significant shift 
in meaning, because in the saying omnia vera vero consonant the accent is 
on the harmony of “all truths”, which conveyed the idea that Aristotle’s 
intention was to emphasize not the agreement between facts and truths, or 
in other words between data and true statements, but rather the agreement 
between true statements. 
This happened first of all because the principle of the unity of truth was 
perceived as a corollary of the principle of non-contradiction, clearly and 
repeatedly presented in the fourth book of the Metaphysics and in the first 
of the Posterior Analitics as the fundamental principle of scientific inquiry, 
reasoning and communication. Moreover, in Prior Analytics I, 32 (47a 8-9) 
Aristotle claimed that “everything that is true must in every respect agree 
with itself”. Having in mind both this passage and that of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, the greatest Islamic interpreter of Aristotle, i.e. Averroes, proposed 
his own version of the principle of the unity of truth. If in his middle com-
mentary on the De interpretatione he simply emphasized that “it is impos-
sible that truth is contrary to truth”,22 in his long commentary on Aris-
 
20 “With what is true all things which really are are in harmony, but with that which is 
false the true very soon jars” (D.P. Chase); “Infatti le cose reali concordano in tutto con la 
verità, mentre il falso tosto avverte la sua discordanza” (A. Plebe). 
21 See e.g. the following renderings: “For with a true view all the data harmonize, but 
with a false one the facts soon clash” (D. Ross); “For all the data harmonize with the truth, 
but soon clash with falsity” (R. Crisp); “If a proposition be true, all the facts harmonize with 
it, but if it is false, it is quickly seen to be discordant with them” (H. Rackman); “Car avec un 
principe vrai toutes les données de fait s’harmonisent, tandis qu’avec un principe faux la 
réalité est vite en désaccord” (J. Tricot); “Car, avec le vrai, tous les données s’harmonisent, 
avec le faux, ells sont vite en désaccord” (R-A. Gauthier and J.-Y. Jolif); “Infatti i dati si accor-
dano tutti con ciò che è vero, mentre rapidamente il vero discorda da ciò che è falso” (L. 
Caiani); “Tutti i fatti sono in armonia con la verità, e la verità mostra presto la sua discor-
danza col falso” (C. Mazzarelli).  
22 “Et est manifestum quod credulitates de quibus dicitur hic quod sunt contrarie, quod 
non est possibile ut sint credulitates uere, cum sit non possibile ut sit uerum contrarium 
uero, sicut non est credulitas uera credulitati uere, neque dictio contradictoria dictioni, cum 
sint utreque significantes intentionem que est in anima uera”, Commentum medium super 
libro Peri hermeneias, translatio Wilhelmo de Luna attributa. Ed. Roland Hissette. Lovanii: 
Peeters 1996, 103. This text is not examined by TAYLOR: “Truth Does Not Contradict Truth”. 
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totle’s De anima23 – and in a slightly different form in his middle commen-
tary on the Prior Analytics24 and the Nicomachean Ethics25 – he claimed that 
“truth, as Aristotle says, is consistent and bears witness to itself in every 
way”. Moreover, in his Decisive treatise, devoted to the problem of the 
relationship between scriptural and scientific truths, he stated that “truth 
does not oppose truth; rather it agrees with and bears witness to it”.26 
It is well known that until the Renaissance this treatise was not avail-
able to Latin readers, who therefore for two centuries ignored that Aver-
roes’ discussion of the relationship between philosophy and religion rests 
on the assumption of the principle of the unity of truth. But if their ideas 
about Averroes’ evaluation of revealed religions were based on a limited 
and distorted knowledge of his writings, the fact that he accepted this 
principle, or better that he gave it some of its clearest formulations, should 
have been obvious, since his Aristotelian commentaries were widely 
known.27 Yet, apart from a few scanty references to him as an auctoritas 
proving that “truth bears witness to itself in every way”,28 Averroes’ name 
was for a long time associated with the so called ‘double-truth theory’.  
 
23 Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis de anima libros, III, c. 5. Ed. F. Stuart Crawford. 
Cambridge (Mass.): The mediaeval academy of America 1953, 399: “Veritas enim, ut dicit 
Aristoteles, convenit et testatur sibi omni modo”.  
24 “Quoniam veritas, ut inquit Aristoteles, attestatur sibi ipsi et consentit ex omni latere 
[…]”, ed. Venetiis: Apud Junctas 1562 (facsimile reproduction Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva 1962), 
vol. 1, 92vH. 
25 “[…] etenim quilibet concordat vero et attestatur ei, a falso autem velociter diversifica-
tur verum, et elongatur ab eo”, ed. Venetiis: Apud Junctas 1562 (facsimile reproduction 
Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva 1962), vol. 3, 10vM. This should be the unidentified source of the 
gloss introduced in some Renaissance editions of the middle commentary on Prior Analytics 
and mentioned by TAYLOR: “Truth Does Not Contradict Truth”, 13, nt. 18. 
26 I follow the translation provided by Charles E. Butterworth (Provo: Berigham Young 
U.P. 2001, 9); see also the French translation by Marc Geoffroy (Paris: Vrin 1996, 119). 
27 Significantly enough, Marcantonio Zimara presented Averroes’ passage quoted above, 
nt. 23, as an explanation of Aristotle’s thought, notably of Nicomachean Ethics I, 8, 1098b 10-
11. See Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois. Ed. Venetiis: Apud Junctas 1562 
(facsimile reproduction Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva 1962), Suppl. 3, 390v: “Veritas sicut dicit 
Aristoteles convenit, et testatur sibi omni modo 3. De anima, com. 5, iuxta dimidium, et est 
authoritas Aristotelis primo ethicorum, cap. 10, verum vero consonat omni parte, falso autem 
statim dissonat vero”. Also in a commentary on Boethius’ De consolatione, falsely ascribed to 
Thomas Aquinas but probably written in the fifteenth century, Aristotle’s thesis of the 
“consonance” of truths is presented in terms which recall not only the saying of the 
Auctoritates Aristotelis but also Averroes’ passages quoted above, nt. 23-25. See S. Thomae 
Aquinatis Opera Omnia. Parmae: Typis P. Fiaccadori 1869, vol. 24.3, 39b: “Nam vero omnia 
consonant, et veritas sibiipsi attestatur secundum Aristotelem”. 
28 As far as I know, John Wyclif is one of the rare thinkers who repeatedly refer to Aver-
roes as an auctoritas in favour of the unity of truth: see Trialogus, II, c. 12. Ed. Gotthardus 
Lechler. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1869, 116: “Et cum Auerrois dicat, quod veritas testatur sibi 
ipsi omnibus modis concordat experientia, quam habemus de malis spiritibus”; Dialogus sive 
speculum Ecclesie militantis, epilogus. Ed. Alfred W. Pollard (= Wyclif's Latin Works 3). Lon-
don: Wyclif Society 1886, 92: “[…] ut Averrois asserit, veritas testatur multipliciter sibi ipsi 
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3. “PHILOSOPHY DOES NOT REST ON REVELATIONS AND MIRACLES” 
It would be difficult to fully explain why this happened, but although the 
causes were various one surely played a decisive role: Averroes’ position on 
this point was read in the light of the position ascribed to his true or 
presumed Latin followers. We must therefore take a further step forward 
in our history, which will confirm to what extent this history – which I am 
trying to reconstruct backwards – is intricate and strange. I recalled that 
the Fifth Lateran Council stated that “truth cannot contradict truth” as the 
premise of dispositions prohibiting to claim that doctrines contrary to the 
articles of the Christian faith were true “at least in philosophy”. This was, 
as we will see, a formula largely diffused among Aristotelian philosophers 
from mid-thirteenth century onwards; and for a long time this formula has 
been presented by historians as the hallmark of the so-called ‘Averroism’, 
which was supposed to accept precisely a ‘double-truth theory’ claiming 
that a doctrine could be true for philosophy while being false for theology, 
or vice versa.  
In the space at my disposal I cannot discuss the highly controversial no-
tion of ‘Averroism’: avowing that I belong to the group of historians whom 
Guido Giglioni wittily labelled as “Averro-sceptics”,29 I will simply say that 
this notion – introduced by the French philosopher Ernest Renan in 1852 – 
seems to me not only too ambiguous, but too value-laden to be helpfully 
used in writing the history of European philosophy.30 It is well known that 
after the introduction in the Latin world, between the twelfth and the thir-
teenth century, of the works of Aristotle and of his Greek and Arabic inter-
preters, it became more and more obvious that they conveyed some meta-
physical, cosmological and moral doctrines incompatible with fundamen-
tal Christian beliefs and the established traditions of Western theology. It 
is equally well known that the Arts masters working at Paris university in 
the 1270s – and first of all the two most distinguished masters, Siger of 
Brabant and Boethius of Dacia – highlighted the differences of method and 
object between philosophy and theology and introduced some important 
distinctions in their commentaries on Aristotle’s works: the distinction 
between expounding (recitare) and asserting a doctrine; the distinction 
 
[…]”. I am grateful to Luigi Campi for drawing my attention to this second text. The source 
of both – which is clearly the passage quoted above, nt. 23 – is not identified by the editors. 
Wyclif repeats elsewhere the saying “veritas testatur sibi ipsi omnibus modis”, but without 
mentioning Averroes: see Sermo 56, in: Sermones. Vol. III. Ed. Iohann Losert (= Wyclif's La-
tin Works 7). London: Wyclif Society 1889, 490; Opus evangelicum, III, c. 66. Ed. Iohann 
Losert (= Wyclif's Latin Works 10). London: Wyclif Society 1896, 247. 
29 GIGLIONI, Guido: Introduction, in: ID. (ed.): Renaissance Averroism and its Aftermath: 
Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. Dordrecht: Springer 2013, 1–34, at 11. 
30 See at least BIANCHI, Luca: L’averroismo di Dante: qualche osservazione critica, in: Le 
tre corone 2 (2015), 71–109, at 71–78.  
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between the point of view of the naturalis – the natural philosopher who 
discusses problems rationally – and that of the fidelis – who takes into 
account revealed truths; and finally the distinction between what is true 
“speaking naturally” or “according to the philosophers” and what is true 
“according to faith”. Far from being simple disclaimers, meant to avoid 
troubles with censors and Church authorities, these formulas reflect a pre-
cise conception of what sciences – in the Aristotelian sense of the term – 
are, or must be. They are grounded on the epistemological rule, inspired 
by Aristotle and diffused by Albert the Great, that every specialist of a 
science – or, to use medieval terminology, every artifex – must keep within 
the boundaries set by the principles of his science. This led, on the one 
hand, to a campaign for the autonomy of rational disciplines, challenging 
the old accepted scheme of their ‘ancillarity’ to theology; on the other 
hand, it prompted the recognition of the limits of these disciplines. Know-
ing that whatever logically derives from certain principles is valid in rela-
tion to these principles, and that the principles on which philosophical 
disciplines are founded are established by generalizing empirical data, 
thirteenth-century Parisian Arts masters were ready to grant that their 
conclusions had only a limited degree of certainty, because a supernatural 
cause might intervene so as to suspend or violate these same principles.31 
Although this approach was a development of a strategy for avoiding 
the conflict between Aristotle’s philosophy and Christian faith adopted by 
the Dominican friar Albert the Great, it was perceived by several thir-
teenth-century theologians as potentially dangerous because it contested 
the traditional hierarchy of sciences and allowed scientific disciplines to 
affirm conclusions which were at odds with the tenets of the Christian 
faith. In the prologue to his 1277 condemnation the bishop of Paris Étienne 
Tempier voiced these sentiments and rebuked no better identified studen-
tes in artibus who, in his opinion, were spreading dangerous doctrines and, 
trying to justify themselves, stated “that these things are true according to 
philosophy but not according to the Catholic faith, as if there were [quasi 
sint] two contrary truths, and as if there were [quasi … sit] a truth in the 
sayings of the damned pagans that is opposed to the truth of the Sacred 
scripture”.32 
Generally considered as the first appearance of the ‘double-truth theo-
ry’, this text is more ambiguous than it appears at first glance and would 
deserve a careful analysis. I content myself with remarking that Tempier 
twice employs the term quasi, which seems to suggest that his reproach is 
based on an inference from what the studentes in artibus affirm rather 
 
31 See BIANCHI, Luca: Loquens ut naturalis, in: BIANCHI, Luca/RANDI, Eugenio: Le verità 
dissonanti. Aristotele alla fine del medioevo. Roma: Laterza 1990, 33–56. 
32 I quote from PICHÉ, David: La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, 
introduction et commentaire. Paris: Vrin 74. 
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than on what they actually say. In other words, he is making explicit what 
the attitude of these scholars supposedly implies. In order to find some-
thing closer to ‘double-truth’ in the proper sense of the term, one must 
turn to the list of 219 articles whose teaching was prohibited, where one can 
read at least three suspect articles. Articles 113 and 184 have the form ‘P is 
impossible according to philosophy, but non-P must be held by faith’.33 
Article 90 explicitly hints at the possibility of making two contradictory 
statements, namely: “That the natural philosopher must deny without 
qualification [simpliciter] that the world began to be, since he bases him-
self upon natural causes and natural arguments. The believer can instead 
deny the eternity of the world because he bases himself upon supernatural 
causes”.34 One might wonder, however, if these articles reflect what Arts 
masters and bachelors actually taught, or if they indicate what was 
ascribed to them by the committee of theologians, appointed by bishop 
Tempier, who selected which ‘errors’ were to be banned. 
The answer is clear when one examines the most significant case, that 
of article 90. It is obvious that this article is taken from the key-passage of 
the treatise On the eternity of the world authored by Boethius of Dacia, 
whose name is mentioned in two fourteenth-century manuscripts as one of 
the main supporters of the condemned articles. For this reason, when in 
1954 the Hungarian scholar Geza Sajó discovered this treatise, he presen-
ted it as the source of both article 90 and the “doctrine of double truth”.35 
Yet, great medievalists soon gave a different interpretation, whose accura-
cy was later recognized by Sajó himself and is now almost universally 
accepted. According to this interpretation, the Danish master – whose de-
clared purpose was to “bring into harmony [reducere ad concordiam] the 
view of Christian faith concerning the eternity of the world and the view of 
Aristotle and of certain other philosophers” – does not say that the natural 
philosopher must deny the beginning of the world simpliciter, i.e. without 
qualification, absolutely speaking. He says precisely the contrary, i.e. that 
the position of the natural philosopher is false “when it is taken in the ab-
solute sense [accepta absolute]”. Bishop Tempier and his committee 
therefore gave – one cannot know whether intentionally or not – a radica-
lized and distorted version of Boethius’ position.36 
 
33 Ibidem, 112, § 113: “Quod anima separata non est alterabilis secundum philosophiam, 
licet secundum fidem alteretur” ; 134, § 184 : “Quod creatio non est possibilis, quamvis con-
trarium tenendum sit secundum fidem”. 
34 Ibidem, 106, § 90: “Quod naturalis philosophus debet negare simpliciter mund nouita-
tem, quia innititur causis naturalibus et rationibus naturalibus. Fidelis autem potest negare 
mundi aeternitatem, quia innititur causis supernaturalibus”. 
35 SAJÓ, Geza: Un traité récemment découvert de Boèce de Dacie De aeternitate mundi. 
Texte inédit avec une introduction critique. Budapest: Akademiai Kaidó 1954, 37. 
36 I quote from the critical edition published in Boethii Daci Opera. Topica – Opuscula. 
VI.2. Ed. Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen (= Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi). 
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A few points may be added to better qualify this reading.37 In order to 
show that there is no real contradiction between the conclusions of the 
natural philosopher and the teachings of faith Boethius distinguishes what 
is stated in the absolute sense, without qualification (simpliciter, absolute), 
and what is stated with qualification, in a certain respect (secundum quid). 
This distinction is taken from Aristotle, who in his Sophistical Refutations 
(5, 166b38-167a14) warns that several fallacies depend on the fact that ex-
pressions used in a certain respect are interpreted as valid in the absolute 
sense, or vice versa. Medieval logicians largely examined this kind of falla-
cies, called fallaciae secundum quid et simpliciter, and in so doing they 
systematically used the example of dark skinned people introduced by 
Aristotle himself. After noting that the conclusion wherein the natural phi-
losopher asserts that the world did not begin to be follows from his prin-
ciples but “is false when it is taken in the absolute sense”, Boethius ob-
viously hints at this example when he adds: “For we know that both he 
who says that Socrates is white, and he who denies that Socrates is white 
in certain respect [secundum quaedam], tell the truth”. It is therefore evi-
dent that in order to defend the unity of truth, which is a corollary of Aris-
totle’s principle of non-contradiction, Boethius makes recourse to another 
Aristotelian logical tool: the distinction between what is stated absolutely 
and what is stated in a certain respect. But whereas Aristotle introduced it 
in order to warn that one is not allowed to take in the absolute sense what 
is said in a particular sense, and vice versa, because this would make one’s 
arguments fallacious, Boethius employs this distinction in order to empha-
size that there is no contradiction between what is said to be true in the 
absolute sense and what is said to be true in a certain respect.  
It is also significant that Boethius felt free to employ the term ‘truth’ in 
relation to the statements of the natural philosopher who – he writes – 
“tells the truth” when he holds that the beginning of the world is impos-
sible “from natural causes and principles”. Most of the great medievalists 
who, from the 1950s onwards, promoted the deep historiographical revi-
sion which led to acknowledge that one cannot find the so-called ‘double 
truth’ in any thirteenth-century text so far preserved, generally maintained 
 
Hauniae: Gad 1976, 333–366, here 335, 352–353. See GILSON, Étienne: Boèce de Dacie et la 
double vérité, in: AHDLMA 30 (1955), 81–99; MAURER, Armand: Boethius of Dacia and the 
Double Truth, in: Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955), 233–239; MICHAUD-QUANTIN, Pierre: La double-
vérité des Averroïstes, in: Theoria 22 (1956), 167–184; VAN STEENBERGHEN, Fernand: Nouvelles 
recherches sur Siger de Brabant et son école, in: Revue Philosophique de Louvain 54 (1956), 
137–147; GAUTHIER, René-Antoine: review of Sajó’s book in: Bulletin Thomiste 9 (1954–1956), 
926–932. Sajó acknowledged that his critics were right in SAJÓ, Geza: Boetius de Dacia und 
seine philosophische Bedeutung, in: WILPERT, Paul (ed.): Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr 
Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung (= Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2). Berlin: De Gruyter 1963, 455–
463, at 458–460. 
37 What follows is a synthesis of the commentary provided in my Italian translation of 
BOEZIO DI DACIA: Sull’eternità del mondo. Milano: Edizioni Unicopli 2003, 38–55. 
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that medieval Aristotelians always used the term “truth” associated with 
faith, and qualify the teachings of philosophy as probable, not as true. Boe-
thius provides evidence to the contrary and shows that these issues are 
more complex – and therefore more interesting. Boethius indeed assumes 
that revealed truth is the absolute truth, but this does not prevent him 
from qualifying as true also the limited conclusions of natural science, 
which are true “in certain respects [secundum quid]”. Since these conclu-
sions inevitably follow from the principles of natural philosophy, they are 
relatively true – true within the boundaries of natural philosophy, which 
takes into account only natural principles and causes. However, they are 
not true absolutely: as we have seen, Boethius explicitly declares that if 
one takes them without qualification they are false, because God is a su-
pernatural, omnipotent cause, and is therefore able to act outside and even 
against natural principles. So Boethius speaks of two truths, one of the 
naturalis and one of the fidelis, and nonetheless he does not at all defend a 
‘double-truth theory’. 
One might object that this solution raises at least one serious difficulty, 
since it seems to be grounded on a relativistic conception of truth. Pro-
posed by several historians,38 this reading of Boethius neglects an impor-
tant aspect of his approach to the relationship between rational and reli-
gious truths. Boethius surely emphasizes that natural philosophy, and 
more generally speaking every form of rational inquiry, is limited: every 
specialist of a given science can indeed demonstrate, concede or deny 
something only in terms of the principles of his science. Therefore his con-
clusions depend on the principles assumed by his science, and as we have 
seen these principles are not absolutely valid, because God’s power is grea-
ter than the power of natural causes. Nonetheless what the naturalis, i.e. 
the natural philosopher asserts as a natural philosopher is true not only in 
the sense that it correctly follows from physical principles, but also in the 
sense that it corresponds to a fact: the fact that the beginning of the world 
is not naturally, physically possible. What the Christian believer says also 
corresponds to a fact: the fact that the world began to be because of the 
supernatural intervention of an omnipotent God, who freely decided to 
create ab initio temporis. This, according to Boethius, whose religious sin-
cerity is out of the question, is a fact, but since it depends exclusively on 
God’s inscrutable will it is known only through revelation and cannot be 
rationally demonstrated: “faith is not science” – Boethius claims – and it 
would be “foolish to seek rational argumentations for things which should 
be believed by reason of religious Law”. 
 
38 Such as Paul Wilpert, François-Xavier Putallaz, Ruedi Imbach and John Marenbon. 
The latter recently labelled Boethius of Dacia as a “limited relativist”, accepting my critical 
remarks. See MARENBON, John: Pagans and Philosophers. The Problem of Paganism from 
Augustine to Leibniz. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2015, 146–147. 
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Our strange backwards history, therefore, ends more or less where we 
started, with a natural philosopher rebuked for having endorsed an absurd 
‘double-truth theory’ that he openly refused; with a natural philosopher 
who – like Galileo 350 years later – tried instead to defend the autonomy of 
natural philosophy, regarded as a limited yet valuable form of knowledge, 
which should be practiced using only rational principles, without taking 
into account revealed truths, supernatural interventions (such as God’s 
creation) and miracles:  
From all this it is evident that for the philosopher to say that something is pos-
sible or impossible is to say that it is possible or impossible for reasons which 
can be investigated by man. When someone puts aside rational arguments, he 
immediately ceases to be a philosopher: philosophy does not rest on revela-
tions and miracles.39 
4. “‘THERE ARE TWO TRUTHS’, SAID THE CAID PLACIDLY” 
In conclusion, the so called ‘theory of double truth’ has its roots in a dis-
torted reading of the conception of the dialectic between the truths of 
reason and the truths of faith proposed in the 1270s by some late thir-
teenth-century Scholastic authors – notably Parisian Arts masters – and la-
ter developed until the Renaissance. However one evaluates this concept-
tion, it is clear that while its first appearance depends on a multiplicity of 
causes, they were all internal to Latin culture. In particular, behind Siger of 
Brabant’s and Boethius of Dacia’s approach to this problem there lie, on 
the one hand, institutional factors such as the emergence of certain me-
thods of teaching and commenting ancient texts, the development of Paris 
university, the transformation of its Arts faculty into a Philosophy faculty, 
the conflict between professional philosophers and theologians; on the 
other hand, intellectual factors such as the growing influence of Aristotle’s 
conception of science and of Albert the Great’s peculiar form of Aristote-
lianism, which encouraged a clear-cut distinction between the spheres of 
rational reasoning and religious beliefs. Averroes had no significant effect 
on the way of understanding the relationship between these two spheres 
suggested by Siger, Boethius and their colleagues working in the last de-
cades of the thirteenth century. It is well known that a few decades later 
another generation of French and Italian Arts masters overtly conceived of 
their work as a development of Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle’s doc-
trines; and it is equally well known that the most representative figure of 
 
39 De aeternitate mundi, 364. On Galileo’s account of miracles and his complex attitude 
towards the use in natural philosophy of the theological notion of omnipotence see BIANCHI, 
Luca: Interventi divini, miracoli e ipotesi soprannaturali nel Dialogo di Galileo, in: CANZIANI, 
Guido/GRANADA, Miguel Angel/ZARKA, Yves Charles (eds): ‘Potentia Dei’. L’onnipotenza divi-
na nel pensiero dei secoli XVI e XVII (= Filosofia e scienza nel Cinquecento e nel Seicento). 
Milano: Angeli 2000, 239–251. 
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this group, i.e. John of Jandun, felt free to expound his views, often with-
out making any effort to accord them with the Christian ones but simply 
adding, at the end of his questions or treatises, short disclaimers and cau-
tionary statements.40 Yet, far from saying that rational and revealed wis-
dom lead to two contradictory truths, Jandun not only declared that philo-
sophical theories are nothing more than generalizations from sense expe-
rience, not absolutely true. He went even further. Discussing a few contro-
versial passages of the Averroes latinus where Aristotle’s remarks on “cus-
tom” as a hindrance to scientific knowledge were interpreted as implying 
that religious training during childhood might impede the study of phi-
losophy, Jandun argued that this actually happens with “false religions”, 
which are “intermingled with errors”; the Commentator – Jandun added – 
spoke precisely “of his religion”, and “if he spoke also of the Christian 
religion, proved by God’s miracles, he would lie”.41 Therefore, whatever 
one might think of their sincerity and efficacy, the different strategies 
adopted by late medieval Arts masters to manage the tension between 
rational inquiry and Christian revelation were not substantially inspired by 
Averroes, and were associated to his name because some of them were 
labelled as ‘Averroists’ since they were influenced by other doctrines of the 
Corduan thinker. It is however significant – but generally neglected – that 
in treatises on the “errors of the philosophers” many accusations were ad-
dressed against Averroes, but not that of spreading an unlikely ‘double 
truth theory’. Relying on a distorted reading of a selection of passages, the 
Commentator was rather presented as a sort of freethinker, who would 
disparage all religions and argue that philosophers cannot believe their 
“fables”.42 
Having started with Berry Stavies’ 1947 play on Galileo, let me conclude 
with a novel about Thomas Aquinas, first published three years later by 
Louis de Wohl and entitled The Quiet Light. Born in Berlin to a Jewish fa-
mily, de Wohl opposed the Nazi regime and was therefore obliged to move 
to England, where during World War II he worked – as an astrologer! – for 
the British Intelligence. A fervent Catholic, he became increasingly reli-
gious and wrote extensively on the history of the Church and the lives of 
saints, from Augustin to Benedict of Norcia, from Francis of Assisi to Ca-
therine of Siena, from Johan of Arc to Ignatius of Loyola. If Thomas Aqui-
nas could not be lacking in such a rich list, there is no need to say that his 
life – devoted to the teaching and writing of rebarbative works of theology 
and philosophy – could not hope to appeal to a large readership. Obliged 
 
40 See at least MACCLINTOCK, Stuart: Perversity and Error: Studies in the ‘Averroist’ John 
of Jandun. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1956, 66–99. 
41 On this point see BIANCHI, Luca: “Nulla lex est vera, licet possit esse utilis”. Averroes’ 
“errors” and the emergence in the Latin West of subversive ideas about religion, forthcoming. 
42 See e.g. the lists of Averroes’ “errors” provided by (pseudo?) Giles of Rome and by Ni-
colaus Eymericus. 
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to give a dramatic picture of the doctrinal conflicts in which Thomas was 
involved, de Wohl turned to one of his best known adversaries, Siger of 
Brabant. In the 1940s – i.e. before the discovery of Boethius of Dacia’s De 
aeternitate mundi, which, as we have seen, was going to spark a great de-
bate about ‘double truth’ – Siger was considered as the leader of the ‘Latin 
Averroists’, who were believed to use the device of ‘double truth’ to spread 
heresies inspired by Aristotle and Averroes. Unsurprisingly, de Wohl’s 
Siger is the herald of a “Mohammedan philosophy”, which “was not an ori-
ginal philosophy”, but “a garbled and Orientalized Aristotelian philoso-
phy”.43 Much might be said on de Wohl’s variations on the theme of the 
danger coming from the East, on philosophy as a weapon used by Muslim 
culture against Christianity, as the “Trojan horse” which might accomplish 
“what the vast armies of the camel driver could not do”. The pronounced 
islamophobia permeating this novel might grant it a considerable success 
even today, although it reflects typically post-war fears and sentiments: 
one need only think of the character of the emperor Fredrick II, portrayed 
as a charismatic leader who, though “aping oriental customs”, embodies a 
conception of the will to power which is very ‘Western’ and has a strong 
Nietzschean, not to say Hitlerian flavour.44 
While Barrie Stavies’ Lamp at midnight is a drama, which may have a 
sad ending, de Wohl’s The Quiet Light is a historical and hagiographical 
novel, which is expected to have a happy ending. One of its lasts chapters 
shows the vicissitudes of Piers Rudde, a young knight who after serving the 
Aquino family and secretly loving Thomas’ sister Theodora decides to par-
ticipate in the crusade of Louis IX. Captured by the Arabs, Piers is involved 
in an unlikely philosophical debate with “their Caid, Omar ben Tawil”. 
Omar “placidly” claims that “there are two truths”, namely “the truth of 
religion and the truth of philosophy”, and “if they come to different re-
sults, it only goes to show the great variety of Allah’s world”. Piers imme-
diately qualifies this as “the error of Averroes”, and adds that the greatest 
of his disciples in Paris, called Siger of Brabant, was challenged by “a 
Christian mullah who had studied both Aristotle and Ibn Roshd”, namely 
Thomas Aquinas, “to fight it out with him at the school of philosophy in 
Paris before the highest imam of the city”, namely bishop Tempier. Accor-
ding to Piers, Siger “tried to avoid the fight”, but “in the end was forced to 
face his opponent” who defeated him “so thoroughly that the Grand Imam 
who presided at the fight declared his teaching to be null and void”.45 
Needless to say, there is no evidence of thirteenth-century disputations, 
chaired by a bishop, between a professor of Theology like Thomas Aquinas 
 
43 DE WOHL, Louis: The Quiet Light. A Novel about Saint Thomas Aquinas. San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press 1966, 208. 
44 Ibidem, passim (quotations are from 208–209). 
45 Ibidem, 340–342. 
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and an Arts master like Siger of Brabant. We know instead that in his De 
unitate intellectus Thomas, without naming him, harshly criticizes Siger 
and invites him to reply “in writing, if he dares” – which Siger actually did. 
We also know that, in this treatise, Thomas does not openly charge Siger 
with defending ‘double truth’: Thomas rather tries to drive him into a 
corner, showing that he cannot say “I conclude necessarily that intellect is 
numerically one, but I firmly hold the opposite by faith”, because “since 
the only thing that can be necessarily concluded is a necessary truth whose 
opposite is false and impossible, it follows from this statement that faith is 
of the false and impossible”.46 In doing so, Thomas applies to a heated case 
the general principle – which he had formulated in his commentary on 
Boethius’ De Trinitate – that what reason demonstrates to be true cannot 
contradict a tenet of Christian faith, because “it would be necessary that 
one or the other be false, and since both are for us from God, God would 
be responsible for making us believe something false – which is im-
possible”.47 This is undoubtedly a brilliant polemical strategy, although 
one might wonder to what extent it was effective against Siger, who, at 
least in his extant works, never made the statement which Thomas pre-
sents as a quotation (from him?). However it might be, one point should 
be clear. Only in edifying novels do threats for Christianity always come 
from without, from different cultures, from ‘impious’ thinkers such as 
Averroes; in real history it was within Latin Christian thought that the 
different ways of conceiving the relationship between ‘reason’ and ‘faith’ 
generated the phantom of ‘double truth’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 De Unitate intellectus, c. 5, in: Opera Omnia. Ed. Leonine. Roma: Editori di San Tom-
maso 1976, vol. 43, 314. 
47 Super Boethium De Trinitate, I, q. 2, a. 3, in: Opera Omnia. Ed. Leonine. Roma: Com-
missio Leonina 1992, vol. 50, 99.  
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Abstract 
In 1633 pope Urban VIII received from the Jesuit theologian Melchior 
Inchofer the Tractatus syllepticus, expressly conceived as a justification of 
the sentence against Galileo. Inchofer referred to the bull Apostolici regi-
minis, published in 1513 by pope Leo X, in order to argue that “truth does not 
contradict truth”, and therefore Copernicans were not allowed to use the 
“artful distinction” between what can be said “according to philosophy” and 
what can be said “according to theology”. It is well known that the afore-
mentioned distinction had been widely used by Aristotelian philosophers 
since the mid-thirteenth century; and for a long time historians presented it 
as the hallmark of the so-called ‘Averroism’, which supposedly accepted a 
‘double-truth theory’ claiming that a doctrine could be true for philosophy 
while being false for theology (or vice versa). This paper shows that the roots 
of the principle of the unity of truth, sanctioned by Leo X in his attack 
against the masters of philosophy who supported ‘Alexandrist’ and 
‘Averroist’ interpretations of Aristotle’s psychology, can be found not only in 
Aristotle’s but also in Averroes’ works; that Averroes gave it one of its 
clearest formulations; and that Averroes had no significant impact on the 
understanding of the relationship between philosophy and religious beliefs 
articulated by the thirteenth-century Parisian Arts masters generally 
labelled as ‘Latin Averroists’. Rebuked in 1277 by bishop Tempier for holding 
that there are “two contrary truths”, these masters did indeed try to avoid 
the conflict between Aristotle’s philosophy and the teachings of the 
Christian faith by using Aristotelian logical tools. However one evaluates 
their strategy, it seems clear that it was within Latin Christian thought that 
the different conceptions of the dialectic between ‘reason’ and ‘faith’ 
generated the phantom of ‘double truth’. 
 
 
